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Amid growing congestion on urban roads and aging highway infrastructure, the merits of road tolls are
receiving increasing international attention. Direct road user charges in the form of electronic highway
tolls, area charges, or distance-based charges are not only a tool to alleviate traffic congestion, they confront
drivers with the costs of road damage and emissions.
This Commentary lays out the merits of road pricing and discusses design considerations, describes
the state of play in implementing road pricing worldwide, and makes the case for road pricing in Canada.
Among key conclusions:
• Congestion is a serious and growing problem in major Canadian cities as measured by the costs
of travel delay, additional fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Canada’s nine
largest urban areas, by one estimate, face annual costs of $3 billion.
￿ Neither fuel taxes nor parking fees are effective in dealing with traffic congestion.
Appropriately designed road-pricing schemes are the best instrument. Road-pricing’s
usefulness in charging for road damage, insurance, and so on are a bonus.
￿ Net revenues from road charges, after deducting operating costs, can be used for various
purposes: to pay for road construction and maintenance, to support other modes of transport,
or to reduce other distorting taxes; they can also enhance the public’s acceptance of road pricing
by compensating potential losers.
￿ Claims that road pricing hurts the poor are exaggerated. Poorer people travel less than richer
people. They rely more on urban public transport, which would speed up if there were fewer
cars on the road, and they would benefit if road-pricing revenues were used to enhance public
transport service. Also, policymakers may choose to address equity concerns by offering
discounts or exemptions.
Experience with road pricing generally — and congestion pricing specifically — is growing around the
globe. Research and planning in Canada should begin now on road pricing for heavily congested urban
highways and/or downtown areas.
The goal should not be to implement schemes that meet a theoretical ideal. Road-pricing programs
should pass a cost-benefit test, be adaptable to changing circumstances, and not soon become
technologically obsolete. Privately operated schemes have the potential to reduce implementation and
operating costs and to accelerate development, and thus warrant serious consideration.
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ighway 407 stretches across Toronto from Burlington to Pickering.
When the first stage opened in 1997, Highway 407 became the world’s
first all-electronic, barrier-free toll highway. To travel its full length
during the peak period, a motorist now pays C$18.87.
1 Off-peak rates
are only slightly lower. Heavy single-unit vehicles pay twice as much per
kilometre as cars, and heavy multiple-unit vehicles pay three times as much. Yet,
on an average workday, more than 350,000 trips are made on Highway 407. The
main attraction is that it offers a (usually) free-flowing alternative to surface streets
and the very heavily congested Highway 401, which runs roughly in parallel a few
kilometres away.
Highway 407 is the most prominent toll road in Canada and accounts for
roughly half the total traffic on all national toll roads combined. Since 1999,
Highway 407 has been owned and operated by a private entity, 407 ETR
Concession Company Limited. The company is not subject to direct toll regulation,
and (presumably) does not set tolls with the primary objective of relieving
congestion. But a handful of congestion-pricing schemes are now operating in
other countries, and the idea is attracting much attention from researchers,
policymakers, and the public worldwide.
Several reasons exist for the growing enthusiasm for road pricing generally,
and congestion pricing specifically. Electronic tolling technology has become
cheaper, it is nearly 100 percent reliable, and drivers can pay without stopping.
Congestion delays and uncertainty about travel times are mounting just when
reliable transport is becoming more important — both to people with harried
schedules and to freight shippers with just-in-time delivery deadlines. Stop-and-
go traffic contributes to emissions of local pollutants and greenhouse gases.
Traditional supply and travel demand management policies
2 are limited in
effectiveness. And road transport infrastructure is aging. Existing funding
mechanisms such as the fuel tax are unlikely to yield enough revenues to pay for
future maintenance, rehabilitation, and new construction — at least without large
and politically unpopular increases in tax rates.
3
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comments on an earlier draft.
1 Toll calculated for a light vehicle equipped with a transponder entering from the Queen Elizabeth
Way and exiting at Highway 7 (Brock Road), a distance of 107.2 kilometres. On February 1, 2007,
the toll rate for light vehicles (weighing less than 5,000 kilograms) was set at 17.6¢ per kilometre.
The peak period applies from 6:00 am to 10:00 am, and from 3:00 pm to 6:00 pm. According to a
reviewer, the average trip length is 20 kilometres, for which the toll is $3.52. Only a very small
fraction of users travels the full length of the highway.
2 See Box 1 for a glossary of italicized terms.
3 Reference is sometimes made to a large and unfunded transportation “infrastructure gap” that
calls for additional spending. As Kitchen (2003) and Mintz and Roberts (2006, 14) point out, the
idea of a “gap” implies that current expenditures fall short of some optimal amount. Determining
the optimum is difficult because of the multiple tradeoffs that need to be weighed in choosing
investments (Mintz 2006). Kitchen (2003) reviews a number of studies that have attempted to
measure the size of the gap in Canada. He identifies various difficulties with such studies,
including incomplete information about the quality of infrastructure, differences in views about
appropriate quality standards, and the implicit assumption that the existing system of pricing
road use will persist. If a more efficient system is eventually adopted, demand is likely to
decrease — and with it the measured infrastructure gap.As this list suggests, road pricing has been motivated not only as a tool to
alleviate traffic congestion, but also as a way to face drivers with the costs they
impose in road damage, emissions, and other traffic-generated externalities. Road
pricing is also a source of revenue. Following an earlier paper of mine (Lindsey
2006, appendix A), I define road pricing to include any form of direct road user
charge — highway tolls, cordon tolls, area charges, distance-based charges, and so
on — imposed for any purpose.
4 I exclude indirect road charges — such as
registration and licence fees, fuel taxes, and tire taxes — parking fees and parking
fines, shadow tolls, and tradable driving permits, as well as charges on
nonmotorized forms of transport. I consider, however, the virtues and limitations
of fuel taxes and parking fees. 
Quite a number of authoritative surveys and policy papers about road pricing
have recently appeared.
5 It is impossible in this space to cover all the relevant
ground,
6 so here I set myself three goals: to identify the merits of road pricing and
discuss some of the design considerations, to describe the state of play in
implementing road pricing worldwide, and to assess the case for road pricing in
Canada. I concentrate on the potential for road pricing to alleviate traffic
congestion, and consequently focus on urban rather than intercity road pricing.
I come out strongly in favour of road pricing for Canada. In brief, the main
points in the argument are as follows:
￿ Congestion is a serious and growing problem in major Canadian cities.
Selective construction and expansion of roads is warranted, but it is
expensive and environmentally disruptive. Moreover, it encourages more
driving as well as urban sprawl.
￿ As far as the price mechanism is concerned, fuel taxes are efficient as a tax
on carbon-based fuel emissions. And parking fees that vary by location and
time of day are the best tool for tackling congestion related to parking. But
neither fuel taxes nor parking fees are effective in dealing with traffic
congestion. Appropriately designed road-pricing schemes are the best
instrument. Any uses of road pricing to charge for road damage, insurance,
and so on are a bonus.
￿ Net revenues from road pricing after deducting system operating costs can
be used for various purposes: to pay for road construction and
maintenance, to support other modes of transport, or to reduce other
distorting taxes; they can also be used to enhance the public acceptability
of road pricing by compensating potential losers.
￿ Claims that road pricing hurts the poor are exaggerated. Poorer people
travel less than richer people. And they rely more on urban public
transport, which would speed up if there were fewer cars on the road, and
2 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
4 Rather than use the awkward term “road pricing” throughout the paper, I frequently refer to
“tolls” or “charges” unless a particular term is appropriate for a specific form of pricing.
5 See, in particular, United Kingdom (2004); Commission for Integrated Transport (2006);
Eddington (2006); Economist Intelligence Unit (2006); European Conference Ministers of
Transport (2006); Partnership for New York City (2006); and United States (2006).
6 In Lindsey (2005), I review developments in Canada and the United States; in Lindsey (2006), I
examine the attitudes of economists toward road pricing.C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 3
they would benefit further if road-pricing revenues were used to enhance
public transport service. Poorer people can continue to drive without
paying tolls as long as toll-free alternative routes exist. Furthermore, rich
and poor alike value the option to use congestion-free and reliable toll
roads when they are especially pressed for time. Finally, equity concerns
can be addressed by offering discounts or exemptions to certain groups.
￿ Experience with road pricing generally — and congestion pricing
specifically — is growing around the globe. Research in Canada should
begin now on road pricing for heavily congested urban highways and/or
downtown areas. The goal should not be to implement schemes that meet
the theoretical ideal, but schemes that pass a cost-benefit test, are adaptable
Box 1: Glossary of Terms
Beneficiary principle: The principle that taxes should be paid in proportion to the benefits received
from public services.
Congestion, recurrent: Congestion due to regular and predictable travel patterns.
Congestion, nonrecurrent: Congestion caused by accidents, emergency road repairs, bad weather,
and other unpredictable events.
Equity, horizontal and vertical: The concept of vertical equity holds that people with different
incomes should pay different amounts of tax; the concept of horizontal equity holds that
taxpayers with the same income should pay the same amounts of tax. Road-pricing studies have
adopted the two concepts by replacing “tax” with “toll.” One complication is that the amount
paid in tolls depends on location and distance driven. Some scholars consequently interpret
horizontal equity to mean that people living in the same neighbourhood should pay the same
amount in tolls. Another complication is that the net incidence of tolls depends on the disposition
of the revenues.
Externalities, external cost: An externality exists when the actions of a consumer or producer affect
the utility or production possibilities of other agents who are not involved in decisionmaking
about the activity and there is no market in which the effects are priced. Congestion and pollution
are examples of negative externalities or external costs.
Internalization of external costs: A negative externality is internalized if the agent creating the
externality is made to pay the cost. Examples include a pollution tax and a congestion toll.
Latent demand: If congestion is reduced by expanding the capacity of a link, using the link becomes
more attractive. Travellers will shift onto it from other routes, other times of day, other modes, and
so on. Demand materializes that was previously suppressed by the congestion, and hence hidden
or latent.
Shadow toll: A toll paid by a highway authority to a private concessionaire on the basis of use.
Since drivers themselves pay no toll, a shadow toll avoids the costs of toll collection.
Travel demand management (TDM): An umbrella term for a variety of policies for reducing or
modifying the demand for transportation. In addition to congestion pricing, TDM includes
promotion of ridesharing, telecommuting, and alternative work schedules; and enhancing the
supply of alternatives to driving (or complements to alternatives) such as public transit, park-and-
ride lots, and high-occupancy vehicle lanes.4 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
to changing circumstances, and will not soon become technologically
obsolete.
￿ Privately operated schemes have the potential to reduce implementation
and operating costs and to accelerate development; they thus warrant
serious consideration.
Congestion Costs and the Merits of Road Pricing
The Costs of Congestion
Congestion delays are generally considered to be the largest external cost of road
traffic,
7 and congestion relief is widely viewed to be the greatest potential benefit
from road pricing. It is therefore not surprising that estimates of the economy-
wide costs of traffic congestion appear frequently in the literature. The most
widely quoted are the Texas Transportation Institute’s annual estimates for major
US cities. According to the 2005 Mobility Report (Texas Transportation Institute
2005), in 2005 congestion created 3.7 billion hours of travel delay and 2.3 billion
gallons of wasted fuel that cost the US economy more than US$63 billion.
Estimates of the annual costs for Europe include US$38 billion for the United
Kingdom and US$800 million to $1 billion for Stockholm in lost time, traffic
accidents and deaths, and worsened environmental conditions (Economist
Intelligence Unit 2006).
8 And according to the TD Bank Financial Group, the loss
from congestion and shipment delays in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) is some
C$2 billion annually (Soberman et al. 2006).
9
Such statistics should be treated with caution, however, for several reasons.
First, the Texas Transportation Institute’s calculations and some others entail
comparisons of actual traffic conditions with hypothetical free-flow conditions that
would be uneconomical, if not impossible, to achieve. Second, the cost of delays is
often determined using a single unit value for travel time delay that ignores
substantial variations across individuals, as well as possible dependency on trip
duration, the severity of the congestion encountered, and whether the congestion
is anticipated or not. Third, the estimates exclude the costs people incur when they
avoid congestion by travelling off peak, not travelling, and so on. Fourth, the costs
7 See, for example, United States (1997, 2000) and Small and Verhoef (2007, table 3.3). Accident
costs may be larger on lightly travelled roads, although the fraction of accident costs that are
external to the user is difficult to estimate precisely. Many analysts count as an externality
parking subsidies in the form of free off-street parking at workplaces, shops and other
businesses, and residences. These subsidies induce distortions in land use and, by encouraging
automobile ownership and driving, they contribute to congestion and other external costs. The
estimated costs of these distortions are comparable to those of congestion and accidents. See the
web site: http://www.vtpi.org/tca/tca0504.pdf.
8 In per capita terms, these costs are roughly US$210 (for the United States), US$630 (for the United
Kingdom), and US$670 (for the Stockholm urban area).
9 According to a reviewer, the Ontario Ministry of Transportation came up with a similar estimate
in the 1980s.C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 5
of congestion are borne by drivers collectively, and only a portion of the
congestion cost created by a trip is external to the driver.
These reservations notwithstanding, congestion-cost statistics are useful for
measuring constituent components of the full cost of congestion and for
establishing upper or lower bounds on these costs.
10 Transport Canada recently
compiled the first set of statistics for Canada that quantify the costs of travel delay,
additional fuel consumption, and greenhouse gas emissions for the nine largest
urban areas (see Table 1).
11 Rather than taking free-flow conditions as the baseline
against which to measure travel delays, the study adopts a percentage of the speed
limit as a threshold below which congestion could be considered “unacceptable.”
Since this threshold varies across municipalities and road networks, the study
undertakes calculations with thresholds of 50 percent, 60 percent, and 70 percent.
The cost of congestion for the nine urban areas computed with the 60 percent
threshold is about C$3 billion.
12 Montreal and Toronto account for 70 percent of
Urban Area 
(2001 Population) Year At 50% Threshold At 60% Threshold At 70% Threshold
(2002 C$ millions)
Calgary (951,395) 2001  94.6 112.4  121.4
Edmonton (937,845) 2000  49.4 62.1  74.1
Hamilton (662,401) 2001  6.6 11.3  16.9
Montreal (3,426,350) 1998  701.9 854.0  986.9
Ottawa-Gatineau (1,063,664) 1995  39.6 61.5  88.6
Quebec City (682,757) 2001  37.5 52.3  68.4
Toronto (4,682,897) 2001  889.6 1,267.3  1,631.7
Vancouver (1,986,965) 2003  402.8 516.8  628.7
Winnipeg (671,274) 1992  48.4 77.2  104.0
Total, all urban areas 2,270.2 3,015.0  3,720.6 
Table 1: Costs of Congestion in Selected Canadian Cities
Note: The data used includes outputs from travel demand forecasting models in each urban area that vary
according to the year of application.
Sources: Canada 2006, table 5; Statistics Canada, “Population and Dwelling Counts, for Census Metropolitan
Areas and Census Agglomerations, 2001 and 1996 Censuses.” Available at web site:
http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/standard/popdwell/Table-CMA-N.cfm;
accessed January 13, 2007.
10 Indexes might also be useful for assessing the rate of growth of congestion costs over time, and
the Texas Transportation Institute annual reports indicate that the costs have been growing
relatively steadily in the United States.
11 See Canada (2006). The unit values used in that study to compute the costs of travel delay vary
by city and trip purpose. For work and work-related trips, they range from $24.71 per hour to
$31.35 per hour; for non-work-related trips, they range from $7.63 per hour to $9.67 per hour (all
in 2002 Canadian dollars). Costs of additional fuel consumption were computed using estimates
of fuel consumption as a function of vehicle speed and the price of regular unleaded gasoline for
each urban area. The cost of greenhouse gas emissions was taken to be $29.97 per metric ton (in
1998 Canadian dollars).
12 Travel delays account for 90 percent of the total, additional fuel consumption 7 percent, and
greenhouse gas emissions the remaining 3 percent.6 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
the total. In per capita terms, the annual cost ranges from C$17 for Hamilton to
C$270 for Toronto. These costs might not seem very large — in the case of
Hamilton, the cost is relatively trivial — but the figures exclude the costs of
accidents, noise, local emissions, road damage, and behavioural adaptations to
congestion. Moreover, the travel delay cost accounts for recurrent congestion but not
nonrecurrent congestion. Given these omissions, the data in Table 1 are likely to
underestimate the true cost, possibly by a considerable amount. Naturally, the cost
of congestion is higher for individuals who travel extensively and for those who
commute by car.
Limitations of Traditional Policy 
Measures to Address Congestion
During much of the 20th century, the stock response to incipient congestion was to
build new roads or expand existing ones. Such a “predict-and-provide” strategy is
almost universally discounted as a panacea now, although selective investments
might still be worthwhile (see Eddington 2006).
13 The Achilles’ heel of expanding
capacity is that it makes driving more attractive, and therefore encourages more of
it. Latent demand for the new capacity emerges as drivers shift from travelling on
other routes and at off-peak times of day, switch from other modes of transport,
and so on. Indeed, road investments can increase congestion costs. Spending on
local roads, for example, might encourage residential development that creates
more traffic, not only on the new roads, but also elsewhere on the road network.
Investing in public transport systems is another supply-side approach that has
had limited success in North America. Traditional rail transit systems operate on a
hub-and-spoke network. When cities were more compact and jobs were
concentrated in the Central Business District (CBD), such networks served them
well. But networks are ill-suited to the dispersed pattern of trips that prevails
today. Rail transit and bus usage can be encouraged with low fares, but since fare
elasticities of demand are typically small, cutting fares boosts ridership only
modestly and it increases operating deficits.
14
Travel demand management measures, such as bans on heavy vehicles and
ridesharing, naturally have a role to play in managing traffic. But these measures
also induce latent demand if they make driving easier for some groups. One
policy — extensively used in the United States but to a lesser extent in Canada —
is to designate High-Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes. HOV lanes are effective in
increasing hourly throughput measured in people only when congestion is severe
and when the initial modal share of carpools is appreciable. Carpooling is
relatively unattractive to most commuters because of the difficulty in finding
people with compatible work schedules and the time required to collect and
13 Using US data from 1982 to 1996, Winston and Langer (2006) estimate that highway construction
and maintenance expenditures yielded a very low rate of return in alleviating traffic congestion,
although the expenditures might have provided safety and other benefits.
14 Fare elasticities vary from city to city, but they are generally smaller for metro rail networks than
for buses, and smaller during peak than in off-peak periods. Estimated short-run elasticities often
fall in the range -0.33 to -0.5. Long-run elasticities are larger, but generally less than 1 in absolute
value. See Boyer (1998, 77); O'Sullivan (2003, 294); and Victoria Transport Policy Institute [n.d.].C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 7
distribute passengers. As a result, HOV lanes have been falling out of favour. As
discussed in the next section, however, HOV lanes have been reinvigorated in the
United States by allowing single-occupant vehicles to use them for a toll.
Fuel taxes are less vulnerable to latent demand than are command-and-control
measures. And fuel taxes are (nearly) a perfect instrument for internalizing global
warming costs caused by combustion of carbon-based fuels. But fuel taxes are a
very blunt instrument for targeting congestion and other traffic-related costs that
vary with location and time. In principle, municipalities or regions could use local
fuel taxes as a crude way to discourage driving. But tax leakage would undermine
significant tax differentials between regions. For example, residents of the Lower
Mainland in British Columbia purchase more gasoline in the United States when it
is appreciably cheaper there. Moreover, in the long run, gasoline taxes reduce fuel
consumption more through improvements in average vehicle fleet fuel economy
than through reductions in distance driven (Small and Parry 2005).
Parking fees are another pricing instrument naturally suited to dealing with
congestion related to parking. Thanks to technological advances in parking
meters, parking rates can be set not only by location but also by time of day,
duration, and average parking occupancy rates (Shoup 2005, 383-90). And since
parking fees are commonplace in most cities, they typically elicit less hostile
reactions than do new tolls. Nevertheless, parking fees are a crude instrument for
tackling traffic congestion. Fees do not vary with distance travelled, through traffic
escapes payment, and privately owned parking space remains free (or inefficiently
priced) unless regulations are introduced. Indeed, if parking fees deter traffic from
using public parking space, they will encourage both through traffic and drivers
who use private parking spaces.
Merits of Road Pricing
Road pricing has two basic functions: as a means of internalizing external costs
and as a way to generate revenues.
Road Pricing as an Externality Charge
Pigou (1920) is credited with the general idea of using taxes to internalize external
costs, and suggested that a toll could be used to reduce road congestion. Their
virtue is that, unlike queues, tolls or other forms of charges make travel less
attractive without social waste. Appropriately designed charges can serve many
functions. Tolls based on axle loads can be used to charge heavy vehicles for road
damage. Distance-based fees can be used to charge for insurance.
15 Most
practically important of all, tolls can reduce traffic congestion by encouraging
15 This is called pay as you drive (PAYD) insurance. Premiums are charged in proportion to
distance travelled rather than as an annual lump sum. The per kilometre rate can be conditioned
on driver characteristics that are used for pricing insurance today, such as age, sex, and safety
record, as well as varied by type of road travelled and time of day or night. Norwich Union, a
large automobile insurance company in Britain, recently introduced PAYD policies after a
successful technology trial. See http://www.norwichunion.com/pay-as-you-drive/, accessed
February 24, 2007.8 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
people to adjust all aspects of their travel behaviour: number of trips, mode of
transport, destination, route, time of day, vehicle occupancy, and so on. Although
drivers collectively incur the full costs of congestion delay, each driver imposes a
small time delay on each of many other drivers. In heavy traffic, the aggregate cost
of these small delays can amount to several times the congestion cost the driver
incurs. The Pigouvian congestion toll is then correspondingly large, and the
potential efficiency gains appreciable. Tolls also serve a long-run function because
they provide an investment signal: high tolls indicate that capacity is scarce and
that capacity expansion is correspondingly valuable; and with tolls in place, new
capacity will not be swamped by latent demand.
By raising the costs of driving, tolls encourage use of public transit. As Small
(2005) explains, road pricing sets off a virtuous circle of effects for public transit
systems that share the right of way with cars. Transit vehicles speed up when tolls
are imposed, because there are fewer cars on the road. This attracts more travellers
to transit. In response, transit operators improve service by adding routes and
increasing frequency. Due to economies of scale in transit operations, the cost per
passenger falls, perhaps allowing the operator to lower fares. Ridership increase
further, and so on.
Road pricing has some limitations, to be sure. Systems such as London’s
Congestion Charge have high collection costs and impose significant transactions
costs on travellers. Tolls are more suited for dealing with recurrent congestion
than nonrecurrent congestion — which calls for improved system management
and traveller information systems. There may be little scope to modify truck flows
in urban areas because of the rigidity of delivery schedules and the lack of
alternative freight transport modes in many cities (Holguín-Veras 2005).
16 As
noted above, parking congestion calls for parking fees. And controlling
pedestrian-vehicle conflicts, inappropriately stopped taxis, double parking, and
the movements of delivery vehicles requires traffic-control measures and strict
enforcement of the rules.
Despite its theoretical appeal, road pricing is opposed on equity, privacy, and
various other grounds. Indeed, the very idea of using taxes and user charges as
instruments for internalizing externalities is controversial, as evidenced by the
emergence of the “Pigou club” and “NoPigou club.”
17 The Pigou Club proposes to
increase the US federal gasoline tax by US$1 per gallon as a way to curb global
warming, to reduce the federal deficit, and advance other goals. The NoPigou
Club disagrees. Among other objections, it notes that the gas tax is too blunt an
instrument to be effective in altering travel behaviour. As far as controlling
congestion is concerned, this arguably applies to the fuel tax (as noted above), but
not to road pricing as long as tolls are targeted at congestion. Moreover, Coase’s
famous argument — that externalities can be taken care of by assignment of
property rights and bargaining between perpetrators and victims — does not
16 However, peak-period cargo movement fees at the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach have
been successful at getting truckers to reschedule freight pickup and deliveries to nights and
weekends. (See the web site: http://www.pierpass.org.) And because of their high opportunity
costs of time truckers can benefit considerably from reductions in non-commercial vehicle traffic.
17 See the web sites: http://www.pigouclub.com and http://nopigouclub.blogspot.com.C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 9
apply to traffic congestion because, with huge numbers of individuals making
frequent trips, the transactions costs would be overwhelming.
Road Pricing as a Source of Revenue
In Canada, one hears frequent calls for additional revenues to fund transport
infrastructure. New sources of federal funding have indeed been developed over
the past few years, including the Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund, the
Municipal Rural Infrastructure Program, the New Deal for Cities and Communities,
and the Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridors Initiative. In 2000, the Alberta
government introduced a Fuel Tax Rebate program that grants five cents per litre
of the provincial fuel tax to Edmonton and Calgary for transportation capital
projects. These initiatives have some limitations — for example, the Alberta fuel
tax rebate cannot be applied to neighbourhood roads. And grants (even
conditional ones) for infrastructure create incentive problems and weaken
accountability (see Kitchen 2006; Mintz and Roberts 2006).
As Kitchen (2006) and other have argued, municipal infrastructure should be
financed on the basis of benefits received. Tolls clearly meet this requirement since
those who pay the toll use the road. Traditional desiderata for revenue sources
include economic efficiency, accountability, fairness, ease of administration, and
stability. As Pigouvian taxes, tolls are economically efficient since they correct
distortions. Whether tolls are accountable, fair, or easily administered depends on
the design of the scheme, as I discuss later. As far as stability is concerned, toll
revenues vary with traffic volumes and, therefore, are not recession proof. But
since it is generally easier to adjust toll levels than fuel tax rates, toll revenues are
arguably more resistant to recession and inflation than are fuel tax revenues.
A final point to note is that the merits of tolls as a Pigouvian externality charge
do not depend on how well tolls serve as a revenue generator. Revenue generation
may be a supplementary — and possibly large — source of benefits, although it is
also a reason for opposition to road pricing.
State of Play Worldwide
Toll roads and bridges are commonplace around the world. But the number of
facilities with congestion tolls is quite small, and the number of area-based urban
road-pricing schemes is even smaller. Here I discuss the main characteristics of six
prominent schemes, chosen to illustrate the variety of ways in which road pricing
has been implemented and to offer templates of a sort for possible future road-
pricing initiatives in Canada (for a summary of the six schemes, see Appendix
Table A-1).
18
18 Commission for Integrated Transport (2006) provides a comprehensive review of operating and
planned road pricing schemes worldwide.10 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
Highway 407 in Canada
Mylvaganam and Borins (2004) provide a fascinating account of the history of
Highway 407 as well as the controversies surrounding it. The highway’s goals can
be described as “diverse.” The concession agreement requires the concessionaire,
407 ETR Concession Company Limited, to comply with provincial safety and
environmental standards, and to relieve congestion on alternative public
highways. Tolls are not regulated, but if annual traffic thresholds set out in the
contract are not met, the company is subject to financial penalties. Peak and off-
peak rates differ only nominally according to the current schedule.
19 To what
extent this pattern reflects the traffic threshold regulations and to what extent
profit maximization is difficult to tell.
20
High Occupancy Toll (HOT)
Lanes in the United States
In the United States, road pricing has been spurred by federal legislation
authorizing the Value Pricing Pilot Program to fund innovative road- and parking-
pricing measures for alleviating congestion. The most prominent operational
projects to date are High-Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes. Hot lanes are a variant of
HOV lanes in which vehicles carrying fewer people than the HOV occupancy
requirement (usually two or three people) can use the lanes if they a pay a toll.
Toll-free lanes run parallel to the HOT lanes a few metres away.
Six HOT lane facilities have been established to date. They feature three
distinct time patterns of toll variation. Two facilities are in Texas; they are not
heavily used, and employ flat (time-invariant) tolls. On State Route 91, the tolls
vary hourly according to a schedule, with a goal of maintaining free-flow
conditions on the HOT lanes. In contrast to Canada’s Highway 407, the toll varies
widely during the course of a day.
21 Tolling of the express lanes on Interstate 25 in
Denver operates similarly to tolling of State Route 91. On Interstates 15 and 394,
tolls are set “dynamically” every few minutes — again with the objective of
maintaining a high quality of service. Revenues on the facilities are earmarked for
operations, maintenance and improvements, and (in the case of I-15) for express
bus service on the highway.
19 For light vehicles, the peak rate, as of February 1, 2007, was C17.6¢ per kilometre and the off-
peak rate C16.8¢ per kilometre.
20 Prior to January 1, 2002, tolls were differentiated in a ratio of 10:7:4 between three periods:
daytime peak, daytime off-peak, and nighttime. From January 1, 2002, to January 31, 2003, there
was no time variation. On February 1, 2003, a small differential was introduced again. According
to Mylvaganam and Borins (2004, 122), the purpose of the differential was to examine the
sensitivity of demand to toll levels.
21 As of April 1, 2007, the toll ranged from a low of US$1.15 at night to a high of US$9.50 on Friday
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Electronic Road Pricing in Singapore
Singapore introduced electronic road pricing in 1998, after 23 years of operating a
cordon scheme with paper licences. The city-state levies charges to enter restricted
zones around the CBD as well as on expressways and arterial roads. Charges are
generally varied every half-hour. Similar to the HOT lanes in the United States,
charge levels are set to maintain target levels of service (speeds of 45-65 kilometres
per hour on expressways and 20-30 on arterials), and charges are reviewed every
three months. Singapore differs from the other five schemes in Table A-1 in that
revenues are not earmarked for any particular purpose.
Toll Rings in Norway
In Norway, the use of tolls to help finance road infrastructure is a long tradition,
and six Norwegian cities have toll rings. Until recently, the main objective of the
toll rings was to raise revenue rather than to manage congestion. Bergen’s toll ring
was established solely as a revenue source for road construction. The Oslo and
(former) Trondheim schemes — which were established a few years later — were
also intended to fund infrastructure for public transport, cyclists, and pedestrians.
Only the Stavanger toll varies by time of day, although the practice has been
proposed for some other cities as interest in managing traffic congestion grows.
Congestion Charging in London
Ken Livingstone campaigned to become mayor of London with a manifesto to
introduce congestion pricing in his first term. His efforts were successful, and in
February 2003, the London Congestion Charge came into operation following
investments in additional buses and changes in traffic-light sequences. The charge
initially applied within a 21-square-kilometre area around the city centre between
7:00 am and 6:30 pm on weekdays. A number of vehicle categories are exempt,
and residents of the charge area receive a 90 percent discount. To conform with the
Greater London Authority Act, which enabled road pricing in London, revenues are
earmarked to local transport for at least 10 years.
Transport for London’s fourth annual report (2006) indicates that — despite
slight reductions in average travel speeds since the previous year — the main
goals of the charge continue to be met.
22 The system has evolved since its
inception: methods of payment and penalties for not paying have been adjusted;
in July 2005, the charge was raised from £5 to £8. In February 2007, the charging
zone was expanded to include Kensington, Chelsea, and parts of the City of
Westminster that were not already in the zone. And Mayor Livingstone negotiated
an agreement to have revenues continue to be allocated to London Transport until
at least 2017.
22 For evaluations of the congestion charge, see, for example, Litman (2005); Mackie (2005);
Prud’homme and Bocarejo (2005); and Santos and Fraser (2006). Richards (2005) provides an
excellent summary of the historical and institutional background to the scheme and Ken
Livingstone’s pivotal role in creating it.The Trial in Stockholm
Stockholm ran a congestion charging trial from January 3 to July 31, 2006. Vehicles
entering or exiting the inner city on weekdays paid a charge that varied in three
bands by time of day. The effects were significant and encouraging. Traffic
traversing the cordon fell by 22 percent, travel times during the morning peak
dropped by nearly a third, injury accidents fell by 5 to 10 percent, emissions fell by
10 to 14 percent, and public transport usage rose by 6 percent. A September 17,
2006, referendum on making the charge permanent was approved by a narrow
margin. Sweden’s new Alliance government ratified the referendum, and plans to
earmark charge revenues to construction of a relief ring road around the city.
Summary
All six road-pricing schemes have been quite successful despite — or possibly
because of — their differences and sometimes relatively crude design. London’s
experience, in particular, has encouraged many cities around the world to consider
road-pricing schemes of their own. Vancouver has plans to toll bridges. San
Francisco has received federal funds to study an area-based congestion-pricing
scheme. And several prominent institutions, including the Partnership for New
York City (2006) and the Manhattan Institute (Schaller 2006), have called for
studies of area-based road pricing for New York City. Some analysts believe that
road pricing has gone beyond the tipping point in the United States.
Design Considerations for Road-Pricing Schemes
Designing a socially optimal road-pricing scheme is complicated because of the
many factors that must be taken into account: the inability to price all roads,
mispriced alternative modes, the distortion of income and excise taxes in other
sectors of the economy, and so on. Here, I limit my discussion to just a few of the
important considerations for system design.
Design Elements
The design of any road-pricing scheme should include considerations of what,
when, and how to toll, whether exemptions should exist for certain categories of
people and vehicles, how to impose and collect tolls, and how to spend the
revenue thus obtained.
Tolled Infrastructure
Tolls can be either facility based or area based. Facility-based schemes include
single lanes, individual roads, and sets of roads. Area-based schemes include
cordons, whereby vehicles are tolled when they cross the cordon in the inbound
and/or outbound direction; and area charges, which are imposed for moving into,
out of, or within an area. Cordon tolls and area charges can comprise a single area,
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two or more disjointed areas, as in Singapore, or a system of interlocking zones
within an area, as in the now-abandoned, second-generation Trondheim scheme.
Facility-based tolls make sense if congestion is localized at hot spots or on
major routes. Area-based charges are better candidates if congestion is
concentrated in city centres, if public transport service is good, and if the goal is to
reduce emissions or to raise large amounts of revenue. Singapore’s scheme (see
Table A-1) features a combination of a cordon charge for restricted zones in the
CBD, tolls on expressways, and tolls on arterial roads.
The appropriate structure of an area-based charge depends on the topology of
the road network and the quality of public transport service, among other factors.
Oslo’s cordon toll has 19 toll stations, Stockholm’s trial cordon had 18, but London
chose not to intercept vehicle movements across the boundaries of the congestion
charging zone because of the large number of entry points. Instead, cameras are
used to record vehicle movements.
The choice between a cordon toll and an area charge has not been
systematically examined in the literature. Since cordon tolls do not apply to trips
made wholly within the charge zone, they are more favourable, ceteris paribus, to
households and firms located in the zone. Traffic diversion and parking
congestion just outside charged areas can be problems, although London and
Stockholm largely managed to avoid them. Areas adjacent to a charge zone might,
in fact, benefit from the reduction of traffic travelling into and out of the zone.
According to Eliasson (2006), many of the benefits from the Stockholm Trial
accrued to motorists who did not cross the cordon but experienced less congestion
delay. The same might hold for, say, York, Mississauga, and other areas of the
GTA, if a charge were levied in downtown Toronto.
Discounts and Exemptions
If a single flat charge is applied over a wide area, discounts or exemptions might
be justified on efficiency grounds for individuals who usually do not travel far
within the area or at peak times. (Discounts could also promote acceptability, as
discussed below.) But because discounts and exemptions dilute or eliminate
incentives to alter travel behaviour, they could undermine the effectiveness of a
system.
23 Accounting and enforcement are also easier if all vehicles are treated
equally.
Vehicle Detection and Payment Technologies
Several considerations govern the choice of vehicle detection and payment
technologies: the goals of the scheme, the size of the road network, the degree of
23 According to The Sunday Times, about 40 percent of drivers who pay the London Congestion
Charge are reimbursed by their employer (see the web site:
http://driving.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,22750-2270389,00.html). How such compensation
affects the travel decisions of employees is an open question. If employers do not encourage their
employees to change their commuting behaviour, employees will lack an incentive to adapt. In
the long run, however, employers could respond by relocating further away from the charging
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differentiation of charges by vehicle type, time of day, and so on. Since satellite-
based systems have high fixed costs but low marginal costs, they are probably not
cost effective except for charging in large cities and for intercity transport, but they
make it possible to charge all roads, including residential and other low-volume
streets. The ratio of collection cost to revenue varies widely across existing
systems, as is evident in Table A-1. London’s high costs are due partly to the
multiple ways of making payments, but also to shortcomings in the procurement
process (Economic Intelligence Unit 2006, 16).
Since road pricing is likely to be implemented in stages, care should be taken
not to invest in incompatible technologies or technologies that will quickly become
obsolete. The advantages of using interoperable technology must be balanced
against the benefits of testing different technologies.
Use of Toll Revenues
A longstanding question is whether the revenues from user charges should be
earmarked for a particular use. Public finance theory says that tax revenues
should not be locked into any particular expenditure pattern because priorities
change over time in unpredictable ways. Earmarking hampers effective budget
control, and can result in shortages of revenues for some purposes and excess
revenues for others. But there are several arguments for earmarking: it is
consistent with the beneficiary principle, it facilitates long-term planning, it can
prevent political abuse of funds, and, as discussed further below, it might enhance
public acceptability.
Revenues from road-pricing schemes can be earmarked narrowly, such as to
the highway on which the tolls are levied, or more broadly, such as to highways in
the area or public transport services in the same corridor. Most existing road-
pricing schemes do feature earmarking, but the practice is not common in Canada,
and it is controversial. The Canada Transportation Act Review Panel, for example,
recommended against allocating revenues from congestion tolls and other road
user charges to road investments if expenditures on other transportation modes
would yield a higher return. Heaver and Waters (2005, 795), however, advocate
that revenues from the federal fuel tax be dedicated to transportation as a whole.
They note the need for road repairs and the fact that the fuel tax is inconsistent
with tax harmonization across sectors.
Two final points deserve mention. One is that, because revenues from
congestion tolls can exceed the efficiency gains by a large multiple, revenue-
allocation decisions can have larger efficiency effects than pricing decisions (Parry
and Bento 2001). The other point is that earmarking schemes are undermined
when funds from other sources are reduced in an offsetting way; for example,
London’s funding from the central government allegedly dropped after the city
introduced congestion pricing (Richards 2005, 83, 214).C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 15
Public Acceptability
Analysts now widely agree that public acceptability is the largest barrier to road
pricing. They also recognize that, even though road pricing can materially enhance
efficiency, it is practically impossible to design a scheme that makes everyone
better off. Even compensating losers by taxing gainers is generically infeasible
because of the high costs of negotiating adequate compensation levels, the
impracticality of dealing with individuals rather than with broad groups,
24 and
adverse incentives, among other reasons (Rietveld 2003). Indeed, even where such
compensation is possible, it may be unacceptable because of doubts about the
possibility of making it permanent.
25
Opposition to road pricing is nicely illustrated by an online petition to the UK
government, open between December 14, 2006, and February 20, 2007, that
attracted more than 1.8 million signatures. The central message on the website
read:
The idea of tracking every vehicle at all times is sinister and wrong. Road pricing
is already here with the high level of taxation on fuel. The more you travel - the
more tax you pay.
It will be an unfair tax on those who live apart from families and poorer people
who will not be able to afford the high monthly costs.
Please Mr Blair - forget about road pricing and concentrate on improving our
roads to reduce congestion.
26
This message voices three common reasons for opposing road pricing: invasion of
privacy, double taxation, and concern about equity.
27 Concerns about privacy have
been largely overcome by anonymous electronic tolling technology, although fears
are expressed about possible misuse of information from future satellite-based
systems. Concerns about double taxation and equity are not as easily dismissed; I
address these and a few other objections to road pricing below.
Paying for something that was previously free: In Canada, highway capital
traditionally has been provided by the public sector and without direct user
charges. Introduction of a toll on a previously free road understandably evokes a
24 A general finding from polls, focus groups, and stated preference studies (for example, Small,
Winston, and Yan 2006) is that attitudes toward road pricing and the likely benefits derived from
it vary considerably within socioeconomic groups, such as high-income auto commuters or
elderly public transit users, that appear relatively homogeneous. Making a particular group
better off on average is unlikely to leave every person in the group better off.
25 Stiglitz (1998) suggests this as a reason congestion pricing has not been implemented at US
airports. Since general aviation pays only nominal fees, a shift to a market system would make
the subsidy to general aviation more transparent and politically untenable in the long run.
26 See the web site: http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/traveltax.
27 Two passages in the message seem perverse. Is “[t]he more you travel — the more tax you pay”
— not both efficient and fair? And “forget about road pricing and concentrate on improving our
roads to reduce congestion” implies that road pricing will not reduce congestion.16 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
negative response.
28 As discussed earlier, a congestion toll can be viewed as a
legitimate Pigouvian charge for creating a negative externality. It is true that,
unlike a smoke-emitting factory, road users are not only the cause of the
externality but also the victims (Hau 1998, 67-68). Nevertheless, economists
usually argue that travellers should not automatically be compensated — either by
rebating toll revenues to them or by using the revenues in ways that benefit them.
System complexity: Polls and experiments on stated preferences indicate that people
dislike complex price structures — either for public transport or for driving
(Bonsall and Shires 2005). This militates against varying tolls frequently by time of
day or day of week, although experience with HOT lanes and Singapore’s
electronic road-pricing system suggest that drivers can adapt if the toll structure is
clear and logical.
Loss of retail business: Retailers generally oppose road pricing on the grounds that it
will hurt their business. A consensus has developed, however, that the effects are
minimal if road pricing is implemented judiciously (Economic Intelligence Unit
2006, 19). Any loss of business from drivers might be offset by gains from
shoppers who use other modes. Walking is made easier for everyone, with less
traffic noise and fumes. Loss of business to nearby competitors could restrain
some cities from implementing road pricing, but this is not a factor for dominant
cities such as London or New York.
Road pricing is inequitable: The road-pricing literature generally distinguishes
between vertical equity and horizontal equity. Conclusions are mixed in the papers
on vertical equity. In an early and insightful analysis, Small (1983) assessed the
incidence of congestion tolls on three income groups. He found that all three
groups would be better off either if aggregate toll revenues were redistributed as a
lump-sum transfer to everyone or if the revenues collected from each group were
redistributed back to that group. In general, higher-income groups are likely to
gain the most from tolls because they place the greatest value on travel time
savings. Lower-income groups benefit to the extent that they use public transit,
which speeds up if congestion is reduced. Empirical studies show that the mix of
people who use HOT lanes is quite varied: even lower-income people do so when
they are especially pressed for time.
Concern for horizontal equity is raised most frequently with respect to
location. One issue is whether streets should be tolled in residential areas. Without
tolls, such streets might be swamped by traffic diverting from tolled roads
elsewhere, but tolling them would penalize residents. Another issue is how to set
tolls on a network of toll roads or bridges. In Japan, the goal of motorway tolls is
to raise money for road construction. The same toll rates are applied to all roads
regardless of their construction costs or traffic volumes, so that the more expensive
and less heavily used roads cross-subsidize other roads. The Japanese government
sees this policy as fair and worth any loss of efficiency. Similarly, a public
consultation exercise in the Netherlands in 2006 found that the public thought
28 This attitude is consistent with the endowment-effect hypothesis (see, for example, Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler 1990) that people value something more highly if they have, or believe they
have, property rights to it. A recent Canadian example is the Fredericton-Moncton highway
project. Under the public-private partnership agreement, the concessionaire was to toll a pre-
existing toll-free section of the highway. This evoked strong public opposition, and the whole
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universal road pricing would be fair, but that selective charging on congested
roads would be both unfair and ineffective (European Conference Ministers of
Transport 2006).
Road pricing constitutes double taxation: In principle, this objection can be addressed
by building revenue neutrality into the overall system of direct and indirect road
user charges. Most existing road-pricing schemes do not feature revenue
neutrality, although the Netherlands intends to modify its current road tax system
and the United Kingdom has considered lowering fuel taxes as part of its planned
national road pricing scheme.
29 The scope to reduce fuel taxes is greater in Europe
than in Canada, where fuel taxes are much lower and concerns about climate
change are growing. Licence and registration fees in Canada are also nominal, and
reducing them would not go far toward achieving revenue neutrality if road
pricing were widely implemented.
30 Neutrality is easier for regions, such as New
York City, where traditional tolls are already in place.
Opposition to double taxation can also often be assuaged by earmarking
revenues to road users.
31 In a large Internet-based survey (Ubbels and Verhoef
2006) of Dutch auto commuters, for example, fewer than 10 percent of respondents
said that spending toll revenues on new roads or to reduce driving costs was
“unacceptable” or “very unacceptable”, while spending on the general budget was
opposed by nearly 75 percent of respondents. Reducing income taxes also
attracted the opposition of a third of respondents. Surprisingly, high-income
motorists were somewhat less willing to use toll revenues to lower income taxes
than were poorer motorists; the authors of the survey suggest the reason is that
richer people value income less highly at the margin.
Guidelines for Road Pricing
Among the guidelines that have been proposed for designing road-pricing
schemes are setting worthwhile objectives, choosing the right technology,
managing costs, and selling the benefits to the public.
32 Some other guidelines
warrant a brief discussion here.
Choose a simple scheme and explain how it works: As noted earlier, road pricing can be
used to alleviate congestion, reduce emissions and road damage, generate
revenues, and meet other objectives. It is natural from an optimization perspective
to pursue them all. But this complicates the design and makes it more difficult to
29 Lowering fuel taxes might be efficient in countries where they are particularly high — Small and
Parry (2005) conclude that the UK tax is more than twice its optimal level.
30 In contrast to fuel taxes, licence and registration fees are fixed charges (that is, they are
independent of the amount driven), so reducing them would have different efficiency and equity
effects than would a fuel tax cut.
31 The lack of earmarking in Singapore is not considered an obstacle because public transport
service was excellent before electronic road pricing was launched.
32 See, for example, Economic Intelligence Unit (2006); Santos and Fraser (2006); and Schaller (2006).
Inadequate public information campaigns have contributed to a number of failed attempts at
urban road pricing, including electronic road pricing in Hong Kong, Rekening Rijden (Bill
Riding) for the Randstad area in the Netherlands, congestion metering in Cambridge and the
double cordon toll in Edinburgh, and several schemes in the United States.18 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
explain how it works. As Jones (2003) remarks, most successful schemes have
focused either on congestion relief or on revenue generation combined with
earmarking. Simplicity in pricing is especially important because people have to
understand the pricing scheme in order to adapt optimally to it. It is also helpful
to explain why the scheme is superior to — or complementary with — other
measures.
Be open during the planning process and consult with the public: The process followed
in developing a scheme is crucial if it is to be supported by the public (Schaller
2006). Marketing is essential. According to Berg (2003, 38) regarding the US Value
Pricing Pilot Program, “If value pricing is to be implemented, it has to be seen as
the logical solution arrived at through public participation, not something that has
been developed in isolation by ’experts’. Just as new products are introduced with
marketing campaigns, new public policies need to be ’marketed’ to the public.“
Make the scheme credible: Even a well-designed scheme with clear goals might be
rejected without some assurance that it will actually be carried out. Stakeholders
must be convinced that tolls will be imposed fairly and will evolve as planned.
And if revenues are earmarked, mechanisms must be created to guarantee that the
money is channelled as intended without offsetting reductions from other sources.
Credibility is enhanced if a political leader is willing to stake his or her political
future on the scheme.
Establish and understand the legal framework: Interpreting the Greater London
Authority Act was a challenge in designing the London Congestion Charge, while
conforming to Scotland’s road user charging legislation was an obstacle in the
failed attempt to launch a cordon toll in Edinburgh in 2005. In Canada,
privatization of Highway 407 required passage of an enabling act (Bill 70) by the
Ontario legislature, and the concession agreement had to be negotiated within
legal constraints. Legal barriers are likely to be larger for pioneering schemes than
for similar schemes that follow on. 
Consolidate decisionmaking: Implementing area-based road pricing requires
coordination of road, transit, urban planning, and other functions that are often
devolved to different departments and levels of government. Evidence from
existing road-pricing schemes and case studies
33 indicates that centralization of
decisionmaking is desirable to internalize fiscal and investment spillovers, and to
avoid problems such as excessive taxation of nonresidents and excessive taxation
of transport when multiple levels of government each levy a tax. The Greater
London Authority Act gave Mayor Ken Livingstone sufficient latitude to proceed
unilaterally with some elements of the congestion charge. In Canada, urban
transportation agencies with some of the same powers exist in Montreal (l’Agence
métropolitaine de transport, created in 1996), Vancouver (TransLink, created in
1998), and Toronto (the Greater Toronto Transportation Authority, created in 2006).
Make road pricing part of a policy package: Selective capacity investments and travel
demand management measures will continue to play an important role even if
comprehensive road pricing is implemented. And supplementary measures, such
as reductions in other user charges, might be needed to compensate potential
33 See, in particular, the Transport Institutions in the Policy Process (TIPP) project, funded by the
European Commission (May et al. 2005).C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 19
losers. Any road or public transport improvements should be implemented in
advance — as was done with bus service in London and Stockholm, and with the
construction of a tunnel in Oslo.
34 Improvements should also be clearly identified
with the scheme, as did not occur for public transport enhancements that
Edinburgh made before a referendum on its planned cordon toll was voted
down.
35
Enhance fairness: Fairness can be enhanced by earmarking revenues and by
improving travel choices. Preserving toll-free alternative routes or lanes has
contributed to public acceptance of HOT lanes in the United States, and some
jurisdictions, such as British Columbia, permit tolling only if an untolled
alternative exists.
Postpone a plebiscite: Edinburgh’s referendum on its planned cordon toll failed to
pass, while Stockholm’s plebiscite on continuing the congestion charge after a six-
month trial was approved. Admittedly, this is scant evidence on which to propose
a guideline. Yet opposition to most road-pricing schemes tends to wane after they
come into operation, the traditional explanation being that attitudes improve after
people experience the benefits of the schemes. In a survey of German motorists,
however, Schade and Baum (2007) find empirical support for an alternative
hypothesis: that people become more favourable toward road pricing if it seems
inevitable, which suggests that holding a referendum after a trial than before is
most likely to improve the prospects of a yes vote. But it also suggests that
skipping a referendum altogether and making decisions by administrative fiat is
better yet. Accountability will still be maintained insofar as citizens can vote
politicians out of office if the scheme proves unpopular.
Prospects for Road Pricing in Canada
With the exception of Highway 407, all recent developments in road pricing have
taken place outside Canada. What, then, can Canada learn from abroad? It is
difficult to assess how other countries’ experience with road pricing is transferable
to Canada — particularly since all the major schemes were pioneering in some
way.
The Current Situation
The possibility of introducing congestion charges is now receiving serious
attention in New York City (Partnership for New York City 2006; Schaller 2006).
Would a London-type scheme work? The two cities are similar in terms of
population, mobility challenges, economic activity, and world profile. But New
York has a disadvantage in that control over its transportation system is
fragmented.
36 There are also doubts that its public transport system could handle
34 Naturally, improvements cannot be financed with road-pricing revenues before a scheme is
introduced, but future revenues can be used to pay off debts on capital outlays.
35 A parallel in Canadian experience might be the personal income tax cuts that preceded
introduction of the goods and services tax but were not closely linked to it (Dahlby 2005, 17).
36 New York also has an advantage in that Manhattan has only about one-tenth as many entry
points as London had into its congestion charging zone (prior to the expansion in 2007).20 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
a significant increase in ridership. Various commentators have expressed
reservations that London’s generally favourable experience with an area charge
could be replicated either in New York City or most other cities.
37
Unlike New York City residents, most Canadians are unfamiliar with toll roads
— indeed, only 19 such roads exist in all of Canada.
38 Before Highway 407, the
most recent tolled facility in the Toronto area was the Burlington Skyway bridge,
whose tolls were removed in 1973. There has been a general reluctance in Canada
to part from a tradition of publicly operated and toll-free roads. For example, in
2003, the British Columbia government devised a plan to privatize the Coquihalla
highway on a 55-year lease, but backed down after massive opposition. In Alberta,
the Public Private Partnership contract to design, build, finance, and operate part
of the ring road in Edmonton prohibits “tolls or advertising to generate revenue“
(Alberta 2005, 41).
There are promising signs, nevertheless. Road pricing is receiving scholarly
support in Canada (see, for example, Brown et al. 2005; Kitchen 2006), and a study
of transportation challenges in the Greater Toronto Area calls for “an objective
assessment of alternative methods of ’road pricing’ or tolls to finance GTA
transportation initiatives” (Soberman et al. 2006, 53). A recent poll of Canadians
that asked “How should new greenhouse-gas reduction programs be funded?“
found greater support for tolls (37 percent) than for an increase in the price of
gasoline (20 percent) or in income taxes (18 percent) (Laghi 2006). And — as I
discuss further below — public sentiment is growing for tolling bridges in the
Greater Vancouver area.
Is it better to introduce tolls on individual facilities first, or begin with an area-
wide scheme? The literature on road pricing is undecided. Cities with successful
area-based schemes have well-developed public transport systems that carry a
large share of trips. Indeed, public transport appears to be vital — in terms of both
effectiveness and public acceptability — for area-based schemes. Good public
transit systems provide a reasonable alternative to driving. And public
acceptability of road pricing can be materially enhanced by earmarking revenues
to public transport if large numbers of people use it and stand to gain from it.
In Canada, however, even in Toronto and Montreal, the cities with the
country’s worst congestion, the share of commuters using public transit — 22.4
percent and 21.7 percent, respectively; see Table 2 — is far smaller than in cities
such as London, Stockholm or Singapore. London’s share was more than 85
percent even before the congestion charge was imposed.
39 Thus, transit use in
Canadian cities seems to militate against area-based schemes. 
Yet, the Canadian cases also highlight the amount of modal shifting that could
take place. Toronto and Vancouver are leading candidates for some form of
comprehensive road pricing, since both have serious traffic congestion problems
and both have urban agencies with some power to tackle them. In Toronto, the
37 See, for example, Hensher (2003), Gray (2007), and Kahn (2007).
38 Bryan (1972) contains a detailed history of toll roads in Canada. Lindsey (2005) provides a brief
update.
39 In 2004, public transport accounted for 39 percent of trips within the county of Stockholm and 64
percent of trips between the periphery and the centre (Prud'homme and Kopp 2006, table 1). In
2005, in Singapore, 52.3 percent of trips to work were by public transport (Singapore 2005).Greater Toronto Transportation Authority, which manages transportation and
public transit planning within the GTA, has the responsibility “to provide
leadership in the co-ordination, planning, financing and development of an
integrated, multi-modal transportation network.” Moreover, Ontario law makes
provision for regulations “authorizing the Corporation to establish and impose
fees and charges and to utilize other mechanisms for revenue generation“ (Ontario
2006).
Vancouver’s TransLink, set up in 1998, was the first agency in North America
with authority for public transportation and roads, and responsibility for long-
range transportation and land use planning.
40 It receives dedicated funding from
transit fares, fuel taxes, parking taxes, and property taxes. Despite these powers,
however, TransLink (and other municipal governments in British Columbia) are
constrained by the British Columbia Guidelines for Tolling, which are worth listing in
full:
2.1 Only major projects that result in significant increases in capacity will be
subject to tolling.
2.2 Tolls will be implemented only if there are clear, demonstrable net benefits for
the users of the new or improved facilities. 
2.3 Tolls will be implemented only if a reasonable untolled alternative is available.
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 21
40 In January 2007, the BC government issued a report recommending a reorganization of TransLink
on the grounds that its governance structure prevented it from making decisions effectively
(Translink Governance Review Panel 2007).
Table 2: How Commuters Get to Work in Selected Canadian Cities
City Car, Truck, Van  Public Transit Walk Other
Driver Passenger Subtotal
(percent)
Calgary  71.8 6.8 78.6 13.2 5.9 2.4
Edmonton  77.7 6.6 84.3 8.6 4.7 2.4
Hamilton 78.2 7.1 85.3 8.0 5.1 1.6
Montreal  65.6 4.8 70.4 21.7 5.9 2.0
Ottawa-Gatineau 64.6 7.4 72.0 18.5 6.8 2.7
Quebec City  76.0 5.2 81.2 9.8 7.0 2.0
Toronto  65.2 6.3 71.4 22.4 4.6 1.6
Vancouver  72.2 7.0 79.2 11.5 6.5 2.8
Winnipeg  70.0 8.4 78.4 13.2 6.1 2.3
Total, all urban 
areas
72.5 6.8 79.3 12.5 5.9 2.2
Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census, Mode of Transportation. Available at web site:
http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01; accessed December 15, 2006.22 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
2.4 The level of tolls and limits on the amount and frequency of increases will be
established in advance.
2.5 Public consultation will occur in all cases where new tolls are considered. 
2.6 The public will have the same rights to access tolled highways as non-tolled
highways. 
2.7 Tolls will be used to generate revenue for transportation projects and provide a
return on the investment of the private-sector partners. (British Columbia 2003,
para 2.)
These guidelines severely constrain tolling on BC highways. Yet, they are
consistent with such principles and guidelines for tolling as the beneficiary
principle (2.2), improving choices (2.3), selling the benefits to the public (2.5), and
earmarking (2.7).
British Columbia currently plans to toll two bridges: the existing Port Mann
Bridge after it is twinned, and the new Golden Ears Bridge, scheduled to open in
2009. The Greater Vancouver Regional District has long wanted to toll all bridges
in the region, a move the provincial government has resisted. But the idea for
comprehensive tolling has gained the support of the Consulting Engineers of BC
(Boei 2006), on the grounds that tolling just one or two bridges would divert too
much traffic onto other routes. According to the engineers, bridges into downtown
Vancouver could also be tolled — but at a lower rate since they are less congested.
Residents of Surrey and Langley, and some local politicians, are also supportive of
the comprehensive tolling plan because they consider it fair (Nagel 2006).
Recommendations for Canada
It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a blueprint for road pricing in any
particular place in Canada. But the economic and engineering literature has
advanced a long way since Pigou (1920), and the field now has considerable
experience on which to draw. Some cities, such as Shanghai, are not even waiting
until they face crippling congestion but are developing road-pricing schemes now,
in order to better manage congestion as it develops (see Commission for
Integrated Transport 2006). The costs of congestion in cities like Montreal, Toronto,
and Vancouver are appreciable and growing, and consideration should be given
soon to plans to implement some form of road pricing. I offer four brief but
specific recommendations for Canadian policymakers.
Fund research: In the United States, road pricing has been spurred by the federally
funded Value Pricing Pilot Program. The Bush Administration is also promoting a
“congestion initiative” that includes grants to develop congestion tolling
systems.
41 The Canadian federal government could follow suit by funding road-
pricing research in Canada. Congestion relief should be the focus, although
41 See the web site: http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB117064116425197878.html.C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 23
revenue generation is worth studying as a secondary objective.
Conduct experiments: The US Value Pricing Pilot Program has funded a range of
experiments spanning HOT lanes, a cordon toll, truck tolls, mileage-based
insurance, and GPS-measured distance-based charges. HOT lanes, of which the
United States offers several successful examples, appear to be a promising model
for Canada to test first.
42 HOV lanes already exist in Canada, although they are
not as widespread as in the United States. The lanes are relatively cheap to build
or convert, and experiments can therefore be conducted relatively quickly at low
cost. HOT lanes offer motorists the choice of paying for a quicker trip or
continuing to drive free at a slower pace.
Engage the private sector: In the United States, long-term toll-road concessions are
rapidly becoming a popular way to fund new highway capacity. Among the
potential advantages of such concessions are that they are quicker and cheaper to
construct, and they contain managerial incentives to maintain highways properly
over their full life-span (Poole and Samuel 2006).
43 Public-private partnerships are
another mode of delivery that deserves study.
Involve apolitical individuals and professional bodies: Road-pricing schemes have a
tendency to become lightning rods for opposition. Dudley and Richardson (2000,
137) claim that apolitical forums dominated by professional norms can help to
legitimize controversial policy changes and bring competing interests closer
together. As an example, they identify the Leitch Committee, which was appointed
in 1976 to review methods of assessing trunk road investments in Britain. Along
the same lines, Mylvaganam and Borins (2004, 113) argue that, by appointing
external members to the board of the Ontario Transportation Capital Corporation,
the Rae government may have furthered a commitment to retaining tolls on
Highway 407.
Final Remarks
In developing its own road-pricing plans, Canada can draw on experience from
Highway 407 and elsewhere.
44 The next steps are important: they could influence
the design of the schemes that follow. Locking in technology now could forestall
future options, and missteps could set back the road-pricing agenda for years.
Such policy changes are driven by a combination of ideas, pressure from interest
groups, government initiative, and force of circumstances. Major political
decisions can result from excessive enthusiasm for a new policy. As an example,
Dudley and Richardson (2000, 16) point to the universal adoption of massive road
construction schemes in the years after World War II, which led to latent demand
42 Sites for HOT lane projects should be chosen with care, however, since the potential benefits are
sensitive to the amount of time saved and the proportion of motorists willing to carpool (see
Gómez-Ibáñez 2006; Small, Winston, and Yan 2006).
43 McFetridge (1997, 44) argues that privately operated facilities might also face less opposition than
public facilities to nontraditional forms of user charges, such as tolls that vary by time.
44 As Poschmann (2003, 20) notes, Highway 407’s electronic tolling technology has been proven,
and both public and private sector agents in Canada have gained experience with public-private
partnerships and contractual arrangements regarding risk sharing.24 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
and environmental and other problems. Care is required to avoid ill-conceived
road-pricing schemes even if their consequences are unlikely to be as serious.
This caution notwithstanding, there are good reasons to proceed with road-
pricing schemes that do not meet the standard of theoretical perfection.
Congestion and other traffic-related problems exact a high cost in Canadian cities,
and even a rough-hewn design that follows the guidelines laid out above can yield
substantial net benefits (Gillen 1997, 211). Particularly for the next steps, the
difficulties of designing the best possible road-pricing system should not stand in
the way of implementing helpful schemes. It can be argued, for example, that
when Highway 407 began operation, an optimal scheme for the whole network
would have called for low or zero tolls on the new highway to maximize
congestion relief on Highway 401, Highway 7, and other roads.
45 In the view of
Mylvaganam and Borins (2004), however, the policy of relatively high tolls that
was actually adopted was preferable for three reasons. It has (presumably) helped
to reduce urban sprawl; it reduced the Ontario government deficit; and it
accelerated development of the world’s first all-electronic, limited-access highway
as a dramatic first step for Canada in congestion pricing.
As London mayor Ken Livingstone explained in his reasons for forging ahead
with the congestion charge,
with a scheme like this, there will never be a time when the information available
is wholly complete, because the immediate effects may differ from the longer-term
effects, since traffic patterns will adjust and re-adjust, and nothing is wholly
predictable. I do not consider that the outstanding uncertainties would to any
substantial extent be removed as a result of holding a public inquiry or
commissioning further studies or consulting further on the scheme. (Quoted in
Ison and Rye 2003, 228.)
If “Red Ken,” the socialist mayor of London, and Swedish social democrats in
Stockholm can persuade their political allies to support road pricing, surely
Canadians can follow suit.
46 Attitudes do change. As Dahlby (2005, 25) remarks, “I
have been very surprised over my 30-year career as an economist to discover that
an opinion or policy that was at one time considered beyond the pale could, in a
short time, take on the lustre of an important and obvious innovation.” Public and
private toll bridges, roads, and ferries were prevalent in Canada in the nineteenth
century. Proponents of road pricing like me hope that toll roads will be resurrected
in the twenty-first century and seem like an obvious innovation whose time
should have come (again) long ago.
45 I am not aware of any estimate of optimal tolls for Highway 407. Before the highway was
completed, Mekky (1995) used the EMME/2 road network software to simulate the effects of
different toll rates on travel times, route diversion, and toll revenues. He assumed that the total
number of trips and choice of mode were fixed, and did not evaluate the welfare effects of
tolling.
46 I am grateful to a reviewer for making this point, in approximately these words.C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 25




High Occupancy Toll (HOT) Lanes
Singapore:
Area Licence & Electronic Road
Pricing
Inception 1997 1995 1998
Goals Provincial: diverse
Private: profit maximization 
subject to minimum traffic 
thresholds
Congestion relief Congestion relief
Tolled area or 
infrastructure
108 kilometres of linear 
highway
Six projects: SR-91, 
I-15 in California; I-10, 
US 290 in Texas; I-394 
in Minneapolis-St. Paul;
I-25 in Colorado
Cordon charge for three 
restricted zones around CBD, 
expressways, and arterial 
roads; charged infrastructure 
progressively expanded
Toll application Proportional to distance Per passage Per passage; inbound crossings 
of restricted zones






Detection: gantries and in-
vehicle units
Payment: smart cards
Time variation Small peak/off-peak 
differential
I-10, US 290: flat
SR-91, I-25: variable
I-15, I-394: dynamic
CBD 7:30-10 am, 12-7 pm; 
expressways: 7:30-9:30 am; 
charges change in 5 or 30-min. 
steps; charge levels reviewed 
quarterly
Toll differentiation by vehicle
and user characteristics
Tolls for light, heavy single 
unit, and heavy multiple 
unit in ratio 1:2:3; 
transponder-recorded pay 
C$2.15 per month, video-
recorded pay C$3.50 extra 
per trip
I-15, I-394, I-25: high occupancy 
vehicles (2+ people) free
SR-91, I-10, US 290: 
high-occupancy vehicles 
(3+ people) free
I-10, US 290: single-occupancy 
vehicles prohibited on toll lanes,
All: heavy goods vehicles 
prohibited on toll lanes
SR-91: Zero-emission vehicles free
Differentiated by six vehicle types;
exemption for police cars, 
ambulances, fire engines





Earmarking of revenues Private; revenues cover 
maintenance and 
construction
SR-91: operations, maintenance, 
improvements
I-15: express bus service, 
operations
I-10, US 290: operations
I-394: bus service, operations
I-25: operations, maintenance, 
enforcement
None; transport charge revenues 
greatly exceed expenditures on 
roads
Supplementary measures Capacity expansion SR-91: capacity expansion Part of extensive package 
(multiple vehicle ownership taxes,
fuel taxes, parking fees, road 
expansion, mass rapid rail system,
buses, taxis, park & ride schemes, 
car cooperatives, signal timing)
Private sector involvement Design, build, and operate 
agreement, financed by 
Ontario government; 
purchased in 1999 by 
Highway 407 International 
consortium
SR-91: Private from 1995 until 
2003, when acquired by Orange 
County to bypass noncompete 
clause in face of rising congestion
Design and build project to 







Inception 1986 2003 Jan 3 — July 31, 2006
Goals Initially revenue 
generation; amendments 
to Road Acts now permit 




primarily congestion relief; 
more emphasis on 
pollution reduction 
apparent with westward 
expansion
Congestion relief and 
pollution reduction
Tolled area or infrastructure Toll cordons in Bergen 
(1986), Oslo (1990), 
Trondheim (1991), 
Kristiansand, Stavanger, 
Namsos, and Tønsberg; 
Trondheim ring converted 
to zonal system in 1996, 
abandoned in 2005
Original: 21 square-
kilometre charge area 
around city centre; 
extended to west in 
February 2007
Cordon around city centre 
with 18 control points
Toll application Inbound crossings Paid daily; includes 
parking on public roads
Inbound and outbound 
crossings
Technology Varies by city.
Detection: electronic tags, 
video or manual
Payment: magnetic strip 
cards, coins
Detection: automated 
number plate recognition 
(ANPR)
Payment: manual by 
various means
Detection: transponders 
and cameras; considering 
switch to ANPR
Payment: direct by 
transponder from bank 
accounts, local shops, bank 
transfers
Time variation Trondheim and Stavanger, 
variable; others, flat
lat charge 7:00 am to 6:30 
pm on weekdays; no 
charge on weekends or 
holidays
Variable: 10, 15, or 20 
Swedish kronors, 
depending on time of day 
from 6:30 am to 6:30 pm; 
daily maximum of 60 
kronors; no charge on 
weekends, holidays, or day 
before holidays
Toll differentiation by vehicle 
& user characteristics
By vehicle type; discounts 
for passes
Exempt: various vehicle 
and individual categories
Discounts: 90% for 
residents, 12.5% for fleets, 
various for monthly and 
annual payments
Differentiation by vehicle 
emissions as of 2006
Exempt: Buses, taxis, 
emergency vehicles, 
electric and hybrid cars, 
traffic between Lidingö 
island & rest of county that 
spends less than 30 
minutes crossing the 
charging zone





Earmarking of revenues Formerly restricted to 
roads; amendments to 
Road Acts now permit 
funding of local transport, 
environmental quality and 
safety.
Revenues earmarked to 
local transport for 
minimum of 10 years
Not applicable for trial
Supplementary measures Road and tunnel 
investment, public 
transport
Increase in bus service, 
retiming of traffic signals
Public transport 
improvements introduced 
August 31, 2005, before the 
trial
Private sector involvement Subcontractor; public 
sector bears risks
Toll collection IBM provided charging 
technology
Sources: Adapted from De Palma, Lindsey, and Proost (2006), with additions from Transport for London (2007) for London; Algers et al.
(2006) for Stockholm, Economist Intelligence Unit (2006), and ECMT (2006).References
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For many Canadians, the modern welfare state is a source of civic pride and part of our
cultural foundation. The public institutions that comprise the modern state, however, face a
continuing fight to retain their legitimacy amid a changing social ethos, and must respond to
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valued principles.
With the advisory assistance of Michael Trebilcock, University Professor of Law and
Economics at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, the Public Services Papers will explore
the role of markets and market-like forces in the delivery of public services. The aim is to
position Canada as a truly competitive democracy; one that provides public services ranking
with the world’s best, in a fiscal framework that supports Canada’s competitiveness and
growth. This research series will describe how Canadians may maintain and enhance public
service delivery in the twenty-first century.C
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